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ABSTRACT
Collateral consequences (CCs) of criminal convictions such as disenfran-
chisement, occupational restrictions, exclusions from public housing, and loss
of welfare beneﬁts represent one of the salient yet hidden features of the con-
temporary American penal state. This chapter explores, from a comparative
and historical perspective, the rise of the many indirect “regulatory” sanc-
tions ﬂowing from a conviction and discusses some of the unique challenges
they pose for legal and policy reform. US jurisprudence and policies are con-
trasted with the more stringent approach adopted by European legal systems
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in safeguarding the
often blurred line between criminal punishments and formally civil sanctions.
The aim of this chapter is twofold: (1) to contribute to a better understand-
ing of the overreliance of the US criminal justice systems on CCs as a device
of social exclusion and control, and (2) to put forward constructive and via-
ble reform proposals aimed at reinventing the role and operation of collateral
restrictions ﬂowing from criminal convictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past four decades, the issue of incarceration has gradually come to
dominate the scholarly and policy debate on criminal justice in the United
States (Garland, 2001a; Zimring, 2010; Zimring & Hawkins, 1991). The explo-
sion of imprisonment rates in America, particularly beginning in the 1980s,
resulted chieﬂy from a range of increasingly punitive “tough on crime” sentenc-
ing policies (Tonry, 2016, 1996; Mauer, 2001) and the behavior of overzealous
prosecutors responding to local political imperatives (Pfaff, 2017). The combina-
tion of these policies and practices led to a growth of incarceration unparalleled
in any other developed Western country and unprecedented in American his-
tory. As a result, the discussion over causes of mass incarceration and possible
ways to reverse it overshadowed several other distinctive characteristics that
make the United States an exceptional nation in terms of harshness of its penal
policies and institutions (Reitz, 2018).
In recent years, however, the focus has gradually shifted to encompass a
broader range of issues in the ongoing discussion on criminal justice reform.
Looking beyond imprisonment, scholars in the ﬁeld of sentencing and correc-
tions have identiﬁed two subjects in particular that nearly went undetected and
have been under-researched until recently: (1) mass penal supervision in the
community, including both parole and probation (Phelps, 2013; van Zyl Smit &
Corda, 2018) and (2) mass imposition of burdensome civil disabilities (either
automatically or discretionarily) on criminally convicted persons. Such disabil-
ities are commonly referred to as “collateral consequences” of criminal convic-
tions. Examples include, among many others: disenfranchisement, occupational
restrictions, exclusions from public housing, loss of welfare beneﬁts, loss of the
right to bear arms, and a prohibition on holding public ofﬁces and serving as a
juror. This chapter explores the latter phenomenon.
Collateral consequences (CCs) of convictions received some attention during
the 1950s through the early 1970s from scholars and reformers concerned with
alleviating the hurdles faced by ex-offenders upon release from custody or dis-
charge from probation or parole (Love, Roberts, & Klingele, 2016, pp. 1012;
Special Project, 1970). Advocates began to challenge civil disabilities as part of
a wider agenda aimed at drawing attention to the issue of re-socialization of
offenders who had served out their sentences. CCs were seen as ways to exclude
offenders from society and increase their likelihood of recidivism (Demleitner,
2000, p. 766). The then-dominant rehabilitative ideal was conducive to such an
endeavor. Yet, before the enactment of signiﬁcant legislation at the federal and
state level, from the 1980s forward voices supporting the elimination of various
forms of legal discrimination against persons with a criminal record succumbed
to popular demand to get tough on crime and criminals.
The demise of rehabilitation (Allen, 1981) and the emergence of a “new
penology” primarily focused on risk management and control of dangerous clas-
ses of persons (Feeley & Simon, 1992, 1994; Simon, 1993) left little room for
comprehensive reform aimed at removing legal disabilities imposed as a result of
a criminal conviction. At the same time, in a climate characterized by policies
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and rhetoric of crime control at nearly all costs (Garland, 2001b), CCs began to
grow exponentially in number and scope, though silently. They rapidly became
a staple of the “shadow carceral state” comprising the less visible yet equally
impactful ramiﬁcations of the US punitive institutions, mimicking traditional
criminal punishment or creating pathways to it (Beckett & Murakawa, 2012).
Over the past 15 years, however, after a long hiatus, criminal justice advo-
cates, policy-makers, and scholars have started to focus again on the panoply of
indirect sanctions that ﬂow from a criminal conviction. At ﬁrst, the input came
from the growing awareness of substantial problems related to mass prisoner
reentry in times of mass incarceration (Travis, 2005). With over 600,000 indivi-
duals released from state and federal prisons each year since 2000 (Carson &
Golinelli, 2013, p. 4, table 2; Carson, 2014, p. 10, table 9; Carson & Anderson,
2016, p. 11, table 7), oftentimes after serving lengthy sentences, legal and practi-
cal barriers to a timely and effective reintegration into society have become an
issue that cannot be neglected or taken lightly (Petersilia, 2003, pp. 105137;
Mears & Cochran, 2015, pp. 125137). It has also become apparent that even
misdemeanor convictions that rarely result in jail time frequently lead to major
CCs (Roberts, 2011, pp. 297303). In this regard, it has been observed that
“as a practical matter […] collateral consequences have become more important
to many criminal defendants than any penalty likely to be imposed by the court”
(Love, 2015, p. 250).
This renewed attention to CCs has produced a massive body of scholarly
work since the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century. Civil penalties that attach to
criminal convictions have been challenged at different levels and from different
angles and perspectives. The goal of this chapter is not to systematically review
the extensive literature on the topic of CCs that has been published in recent
years. Rather, my aim is twofold: ﬁrst, to contribute to a better understanding of
present-day challenges posed by the undue overreliance of the criminal justice
system on formally nonpunitive statutory schemes that accompany criminal con-
victions, often lacking a clear link with the underlying offense; and second, to
highlight different options to deal with CCs at the legislative and judicial level,
and put forward some modest suggestions for reform. In so doing, I will use the
tools of legal history and comparative law to trace the origins and development
of collateral sanctions arising from a criminal conviction.
This chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I sketch a comparative genealogy
of CCs. “Collateral” restrictions linked to criminal convictions originated in
Europe as a form of punishment and later became an early example of legal
transplant from the Old World to the New World. Yet, regardless of the com-
mon roots, CCs in the United States developed in a completely different fashion
over time. The tracing of lines of descent and development of CCs allows shed-
ding light on what prevented American jurisdictions from scrutinizing and
selecting disabilities arising from a conviction and eventually integrating a few
of them into a coherent framework of criminal penalties, opting instead for the
civil/regulatory classiﬁcation. In the second part, I then discuss the multifaceted
notion of “collateral consequences of conviction” and describe how they rose to
become a prominent feature of today’s American penal state. The third part of
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the chapter focuses on the role of the courts. I analyze how the more stringent
approach of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has proved more
effective than the deferential approach of the US judicial actors in safeguarding
the often blurred line between criminal punishments and civil measures. Finally,
I discuss pros and cons of different options to deal with CCs, namely: (1) recog-
nizing them as forms of state regulation aimed at preventing risk to be imposed
by non-criminal justice actors when deemed necessary to achieve public safety/
harm prevention goals; (2) integrating, to various degrees, “civil” CCs into the
sentencing stage of the criminal process; and (3) acknowledging CCs as formal
punishment.
A COMPARATIVE GENEALOGY OF
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Modern-day CCs have their roots in the two ancient concepts of “civil death”
and “infamy.” The two concepts are distinct, yet they have been occasionally
confused and conﬂated by scholars and court opinions. Civil death came ﬁrst in
classical antiquity. The perpetrator of certain heinous crimes was pronounced
“civilly dead,” that is dead in the view of the law. The civilly dead lost all his
civil rights and capacities and could also be killed with impunity. As the Greek
and Roman civilizations reached their maturity, “a more humane approach
toward disabilities ﬂowing from convictions of crime prevailed” (Damasˇka,
1968, p. 351). Civil death was maintained for crimes deemed exceptionally grave
such as treason, while infamy operated more frequently following a conviction
for “public crimes” or “crimes of moral turpitude.” Infamy thus developed his-
torically as a milder form of deprivation of rights for offenders who committed
crimes not entailing a permanent removal from society.
In Athens and other Greek city-states, the punishment of infamy (
;
ατιμία,
meaning “without honor or value” or “public disgrace”) was imposed by the
court and triggered the full or partial loss of citizenship rights, especially for
crimes entailing an abuse of such rights. Subject to the penalty of infamy were
also offenses involving failing to comply with duties toward one’s family (e.g.,
failure to assist one’s parents or mistreating them) and the community (e.g., fail-
ure to honor a debt, false testimony, and bribery of public ofﬁcials; Manza &
Uggen, 2006, p. 23). In Roman law, infamy (infamia) was applied to individuals
convicted for serious crimes deemed “dishonorable” or “infamous.” Like its
Greek counterpart, Roman infamy involved the forfeiture or abridgment of the
offender’s political and social rights. The infamis (the person subject to infamy)
was incapable of holding any public ofﬁce (honores). Infamy also entailed the
loss of the capacity to be a witness in court proceedings, ﬁle a public indictment,
represent another citizen, and, in addition, often deprived the convicted of the
right to vote (suffragium; Pettus, 2013, pp. 2628).
Roman law distinguished between immediata infamia (immediate or de facto
infamy) and mediata infamia (indirect or de jure infamy). Immediate infamy des-
cended upon a person after the commission of some acts that were deemed to
deserve social condemnation with no need for a court judgment. For example,
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immediate infamy attached to persons who engaged in a disreputable trade and
to soldiers ignominiously discharged from service. Unlike immediate infamy,
indirect infamy did not spontaneously arise from a certain behavior, “but only
after a court of law had passed judgment on the delinquent on the ground of
some act which deserved to be visited with social disgrace” (Sohm, 1892,
p. 128). In Roman criminal law, too, infamy arising from a conviction was
regarded as formal punishment, more precisely as a “supplementary” criminal
penalty (von Bar, 1916, p. 37).
Labels must not deceive here. The second type of infamy was “indirect” only
insofar as it required a conviction, and not merely a de facto situation, to be
imposed. It did represent a direct consequence of being found guilty of speciﬁed
offenses. Yet infamy was not explicitly announced at sentencing by the court:
civil disabilities automatically followed a conviction as “penal consequences” of
it. De jure infamy represented, therefore, a tacit yet mandatory direct conse-
quence ensuing from conviction for certain grave and dishonorable crimes.
After the fall of the Roman Empire, Germanic tribes revived civil death as
“outlawry” for particularly serious crimes. The outlaw was expelled from the
community and deprived of his legal existence (Itzkowitz & Oldak, 1973,
pp. 722723). England developed its own model of imposing civil death as pun-
ishment named “attainder,” the stain arising from being convicted of a heinous
crime, namely treason or a felony offense. A person declared “attainted” had his
civil and political rights nulliﬁed and his property forfeited (Parkes, 2003, p. 74).
Furthermore, attainder caused the “corruption of blood” of the offender’s
descendants (Singer, 2002, p. 249). Originally, being convicted for treason or
felonies at common law resulted in the imposition of capital punishment, so the
penalty of attainder represented “a practical way of settling the earthly affairs of
a convicted felon soon to be executed” (Saunders, 1970, p. 990; see also
Blackstone, 1769, pp. 373374). American colonies imported attainder from
England. Yet, after the American Revolution, the new states modiﬁed the
English version of civil death. Colonial versions of attainder were extended to
offenses not punished by death  in particular those deﬁned as egregious viola-
tions of the moral code of the community (“crimes of moral turpitude” or “infa-
mous crimes”). American colonies also started to question the perpetual
character of deprivation of certain rights following conviction (Ewald, 2002,
pp. 10601061). In a sense, this processes resembled the emergence of infamy in
Ancient Greek and Rome as a milder version of civil death.
The US Constitution in 1789 explicitly forbade legislative bills of attainder at
the federal and state level (Article I, Sections 910). Article III, Section 3 pro-
hibited corruption of blood or forfeiture for treason, “except during the life of
the person attainted.” Despite the importance the framers of the Constitution
gave to the issue, in 1799 New York State enacted the ﬁrst “civil death” statute
in the United States targeting persons sentenced to imprisonment for life, who
were deprived of all civil rights. At least a third of American states followed in
the footsteps of NY legislation (McLennan, 2011, p. 195). In the mid-twentieth
century, most civil death statutes were repealed or voided, wholly or in part, by
court decisions (Chin, 2012, pp. 17971798). However, while the medieval
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ﬁction of civil death gradually faded away, over time various forms of disqualiﬁ-
cation and disenfranchisement laws emerged. A wide variety of legal rights and
beneﬁts were denied to those convicted of a crime, sometimes on the basis of the
felony/misdemeanor distinction, sometimes irrespective of the gravity of the
offense, sometimes on the basis of the infamous/non-infamous distinction, and
sometimes in connection with speciﬁc crimes. Civil disabilities disappeared from
penal statutes to make a comeback “in disguise” outside the realm of the crimi-
nal law as collateral sanctions triggered by a criminal conviction.
In Europe, disqualiﬁcations and other civil disabilities stemming from crimi-
nal convictions followed a different path. They have never been removed from
the formal domain of the criminal process and have gradually become narrower
and narrower in their scope and reach since legislatures repealed civil death
statutes in the nineteenth century.
Unlike the distinction between direct and CCs of conviction in American law,
today the vast majority of European Penal Codes operate a distinction between
main (or principal) and ancillary (or additional) criminal penalties. Ancillary crim-
inal penalties (e.g., Nebenstrafen in Germany,1 peines complémentaires in France,
pene accessorie in Italy, penas acesorias in Spain, and ancillary orders in England
and Wales) are imposed as a supplement to the principal punishment (typically
imprisonment and/or ﬁne). Less often, a combination of ancillary penalties is
imposed as the only punishment. They represent an integral part of the formal
sentence (Demleitner, 2000, pp. 755756). Generally, it is left to the judge’s dis-
cretion to determine whether to impose one or more ancillary penalties available
for a certain crime as part of the sentence. In a few countries, ancillary penalties,
when speciﬁed for certain crimes, follow by operation of law as penal conse-
quences of conviction. Ancillary criminal penalties in Europe are “punitive in
intent” and must therefore “be taken into account in calculating the overall pro-
portionality of the sentence to the offense(s) of which the offender is convicted”
(Ashworth, 2015, p. 380).
This category of penalties includes various temporary or permanent disqualiﬁ-
cations closely tied to the nature of the underlying offense. Ancillary criminal pen-
alties typically include the deprivation of enumerated civil rights, the ban from
holding public ofﬁces, disqualiﬁcations from practicing certain professions, and
the ban on driving and competitive bidding (see, e.g., Sections 44 and 45 of the
German Penal Code; Article 131-10 of the French Penal Code, and Article 19 of
the Italian Penal Code). Disenfranchisement can also be imposed as an ancillary
penalty in a signiﬁcant number of European jurisdictions (Tripkovic, 2016).
Furthermore, in a few countries, the publication of the record of conviction in
newspapers and/or speciﬁc websites is also part of the list for speciﬁed offenses.
While in the US many CCs are universally applied to all persons convicted of
felony-level offenses (Uggen & Stewart, 2015, p. 1872), ancillary criminal penal-
ties in Europe can be imposed only in connection with enumerated offenses by
reason of their inherent gravity or speciﬁc characteristics of the proscribed con-
duct. Thus, not even felony convictions unavoidably entail the loss of certain
rights or other adverse consequences besides imprisonment and/or a ﬁne.2 The
74 ALESSANDRO CORDA
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 N
ew
 Y
or
k 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
4:
27
 3
0 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
main function of ancillary criminal penalties is rather to better ﬁne-tune the
punitive response in terms of retributive and utilitarian purposes.
The emergence of the distinction between main and ancillary penalties dates
back to the nineteenth-century process of penal codiﬁcation when European
legal systems experienced a vast process of penal reform primarily aimed at
making the institution of punishment more rational and proportionate to the
adjudicated offense. Another goal of the newly created category of criminal pen-
alties was to delimit clearly the boundaries of punishment. Ancillary criminal
penalties are provided for in penal statutes pursuant to the principle of legality
of criminal punishments expressed in the maxim nulla poena sine praevia lege
poenali  there exists no punishment without a preexisting penal law (Corda,
2016, pp. 4649).
It must be noted, however, that the framework making criminal punishment
a genus divided into two species  main and ancillary criminal penalties  took
some time to develop in full. For example, the highly inﬂuential Napoleonic
Penal Code enacted in France in 1810 distinguished three kinds of offenses, cor-
responding to as many classes of penalties. Felonies were punishable with vari-
ous penalties: death, hard labor for life, hard labor for a time, deportation,
imprisonment, the pillory, banishment, and civic degradation. All these penalties
were deemed “infamous” and involved for the convict automatic infamous
effects, in particular, a general forfeiture of civil and political rights. While not
entirely removed from the penal sphere, these automatic infamous effects carried
an inherent ambiguity as to their true nature. They did not have to be explicitly
imposed in court as part of the formal sentence. Furthermore, the letter of the
law seemed to link them more closely to the infamous nature of the penalty
announced by the judge rather than to the characteristics of the underlying
offense. From a conceptual standpoint, they could be therefore easily mistaken
for nothing more than an “afﬂictive corollary” of a judgment of guilt and subse-
quent punishment.
This brings us back to the Roman concept of mediata infamia. The fact that
infamy was not pronounced at sentencing generated some ambiguity regarding
its nature and classiﬁcation as punishment. In Europe, the growing awareness
regarding the burdensome ramiﬁcations stemming from being adjudicated and
sentenced gradually prompted criminal law theorists to suggest a more rational
and systematized taxonomy of penal consequences of criminal convictions
(Corda, 2016, p. 52). Civil disabilities came to be regarded as formal penalties
and not merely as “natural consequences” arising, more or less ambiguously,
from the conviction for an infamous crime or the imposition of an infamous
penalty. Such effort led to the adoption of the formal distinction between main
and ancillary criminal penalties.
German jurist Friedrich Carl von Savigny highlighted this ostensible ambigu-
ity in his paramount study of Roman law. Writing toward the end of the nine-
teenth century, he observes that, “In our own time we regard [infamy], in the
ﬁrst place, as a means of punishment, either occurring alone or in aggravation
of another punishment.” The continental understanding of infamy, he continues,
can be directly traced back to the Roman mediata infamia resulting from a
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criminal conviction. Yet the Romans regarded infamy as the “natural conse-
quence” of a conviction for speciﬁed offenses, so it was “never expressed in the
sentence itself.” Von Savigny (1884, p. 145) concluded noting that it is precisely
the explicit and unambiguous imposition of civil disabilities at sentencing that
has “materially strengthened the prevailing impression of infamy conceived as a
punishment” in European criminal law.
In contrast, US scholars and lawmakers went down the opposite route and
interpreted the silence at sentencing regarding the infamous consequences of a
conviction as an eloquent sign: disabilities arising from a criminal conviction
that are not imposed by a court as part of the formal sentence are not punish-
ment. This led US scholars to assert with conﬁdence that American law, “like
the Roman law […] draws and preserves a clear distinction between punishment
for a crime and political and civil disabilities consequent on conviction of crime”
(Schoﬁeld, 1911, p. 330). The Pandora’s Box of formally nonpunitive CCs of
conviction was hence opened.
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES IN
THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE
Extensive and sticky CCs of conviction represent one of the salient facets of con-
temporary America’s penal system (Garland, 2017, p. 4). Although not formally
labeled as criminal punishment, these restrictions and disqualiﬁcations visited
upon former offenders emphatically perpetuate penal control, especially for the
poorest and most disadvantaged groups. They are instruments of social exclu-
sion that create a permanent degradation in the social status of convicted per-
sons. In today’s society, CCs can be therefore characterized as “practices of
social shunning” that have been largely “formalized into law” (Kurlychek,
Brame, & Bushway, 2007, p. 67).
As previously mentioned, a vast number of CCs, especially those “activated”
by a felony conviction, are applied indiscriminately, with a tenuous relationship
between the restriction imposed and the speciﬁc characteristics of the offense
committed. Most CCs identify their triggering offenses in terms of general cate-
gories (e.g., “any felony,” “crimes of violence,” “crimes involving moral turpi-
tude,” etc.; Love et al., 2016). Collateral restrictions operate both during the
execution of the sentence and once an offender is released from prison or dis-
charged from community supervision. Particularly in the latter case, CCs repre-
sent not only legal barriers to reentry but also constitute moral and social
hurdles for ex-offenders in the process of rejoining the community as law-
abiding and productive citizens (McNeill, 2016, pp. 7576; see also Maruna,
2001). In this regard, the stigma of a criminal record and the CCs it triggers
often represent a self-fulﬁlling prophecy in terms of likelihood of reoffending:
widespread access to criminal records information, restrictions on employment,
and loss of public welfare beneﬁts in particular are associated with higher recidi-
vism rates (Sohoni, 2013; Whittle, 2018).
In what follows, I discuss the many-sided notion of “collateral consequences”
and highlight the major factors that paved the way for the exponential growth
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of “collateral” restrictions stemming from criminal convictions in the United
States, especially from the early 1980s onward.
Deﬁnitional Issues
The term “collateral consequences” refers to a complex phenomenon. Collateral
consequences of convictions have been called many names: “forgotten punish-
ment” (Cohen & Rivkin, 1971), “invisible punishment” (Travis, 2002), and
“hidden penalties” (Kaiser, 2016a) among others. Deﬁnitional nuances are
symptomatic of the difﬁculties in outlining the concept in a coherent fashion.
This is for collateral ramiﬁcations of a criminal conviction arise and manifest
themselves in various ways. The core feature different types of CCs have in com-
mon is that they are distinct from the direct consequences of being found guilty
in a criminal case, such as imprisonment, ﬁnes, and probation. CCs “are not
part of the sentence calculus, even though they derive from a criminal convic-
tion” (Demleitner, 2005, p. 356).
Examples of CCs include loss of civil and parental rights, occupational
restrictions such as losing professional licenses, deportation, denial of public
beneﬁts, and registration requirements (speciﬁcally targeting sex offenders;
Pinard, 2010, pp. 489494). Furthermore, in today’s digital age, criminal his-
tory information extends its reach well beyond the internal functioning of the
criminal justice system. Criminal records are now at everyone’s ﬁngertips online
through court record databases, state criminal history repositories, and private
purveyors. As a result, individuals with a criminal history are more visible
than ever before: the status of being a convicted person has become a central
facet of ex-offenders’ public identity, one that pervasively affects crucial aspects
of everyday life, especially during the reentry phase (Corda, 2016; Jacobs, 2015;
Lageson, 2017).
Within the category of collateral, or indirect, consequences of criminal con-
victions, a distinction is usually made between formal (or de jure) and informal
(or de facto) CCs, depending on whether or not they arise from an explicit statu-
tory basis. Civil disabilities enacted by federal, state, and local lawmakers, and
sometimes also by administrative bodies qualify as formal CCs regardless of
whether they apply by operation of law or otherwise. In contrast, all the nega-
tive ramiﬁcations “arising independently of speciﬁc legal authority, and concern
[ing] the gamut of negative social, economic, medical, and psychological conse-
quences of conviction” qualify as informal CCs (Logan, 2013, p. 1104; see also
Love et al., 2016, p. 3).
For a long time, advocates and scholars have primarily focused their atten-
tion on formal CCs provided for by the law while paying relatively little atten-
tion to de facto collateral ramiﬁcations of criminal convictions. Yet it can be
argued that the line dividing formal from informal CCs is more blurred than
one might think. Current legal doctrines have the effect of “delegating” to pri-
vate actors the power to impose informal collateral sanctions such as housing
and employment discrimination, which certainly constitute something more
than mere social shunning. As it has been noted, “so-called ‘private’ institutional
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arrangements do implicate the legal system: employers may deny prospective
employees jobs because of their criminal histories, but not their religions,
because we have collectively decided by law to allow the former and not the
latter” (Kleinfeld, 2016, p. 969).
Private actors, such as employers and landlords, operate therefore as an arm
of the criminal justice system: they effectively act as decision-makers with
respect to the imposition of burdensome consequences of having a criminal
record, though without proper checks (Levin, 2018). This might be regarded, to
some extent, as a new frontier of outsourcing part of the state monopoly to pun-
ish crime (Husak, 2016). While blanket bans on applicants with a criminal his-
tory are generally prohibited, landlords and employers nearly systematically run
background checks on applicants to screen themselves from liability. Their
behavior can be characterized as a “defensive” use of what amounts to sanction-
ing powers.
The case of employment discrimination, in particular, is highly illustrative.
Positions in certain ﬁelds, such as childcare, ﬁnancial institutions, and health-
care, mandatorily require a criminal background check under federal law.
Beyond such cases, courts have established a general rule that employers do not
have a per se duty to investigate criminal backgrounds of prospective employees.
Employers have, instead, a general duty to make a reasonable investigation of
an applicant’s ﬁtness before hiring (Jacobs, 2015, pp. 277279; Levin, 2018).
However, employers systematically conduct background checks on job appli-
cants3 primarily as a protection against potential liability under the doctrine of
negligent hiring. (The same is done periodically in regard to current employees
as a shield against liability under the doctrine of negligent retention). As crimi-
nal history information has become so readily available, background checks
have become standard practice: employers feel safer and believe they have per-
formed their due diligence to prevent any possible negative consequence.
Interestingly, the current situation arises not because of explicit policies that
either require or allow private actors to impose collateral burdens on applicants
with a criminal record. Rather, the imposition of such burdens is boosted by the
unforeseen combination of established legal doctrines and the new widespread
availability of criminal records in a digitized form (Blumstein & Nakamura,
2009, pp. 228330).
For the reasons discussed, it has perhaps more sense to adopt a distinction
between automatic and discretionary CCs of convictions, irrespective of any for-
mal statutory basis. From this perspective, a distinction can be made between
(1) collateral sanctions that apply to offenders automatically upon conviction,
and (2) CCs stemming from discretionary government action or decisions of pro-
fessional or licensing bodies, or private actors such as landlords or employers
(Demleitner, 2016, p. 153).
This automatic/discretionary distinction too, however, presents a gray area.
Consider, in particular, those cases where, even though a separate proceeding
for imposing a civil or regulatory sanction is formally required, the presence of a
criminal conviction is almost invariably crucial in determining the outcome of
such proceeding. Think, for instance, of the non-criminal proceeding required
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for the civil commitment of sex offenders: in many jurisdictions, proof of dan-
gerousness justifying the imposition of such an afﬂictive measure is directly
inferred from the prior conviction for a sex crime. Another example is that of
formally nonautomatic disbarment proceedings through which a lawyer can be
removed from the practice of law: although such proceedings tend to be idiosyn-
cratic, the “good moral character” requirement for bar membership is often
deemed compromised by a criminal conviction, especially for a felony.
The New Rise of Collateral Consequences
The National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC)
assembled by the American Bar Association with the help of a federal grant and
launched in 2012 lists over 42,000 CCs of criminal convictions stemming from
over 35,000 laws and regulations at the local, state, and federal level. Around
62% of such restrictions are employment-related. This effort supports the claim
that CCs have grown so much over time in both number and sparseness to
make their operation largely unpredictable (Kaiser, 2016a). During the twentieth
century, the demise of civil death and infamy seemed to predict the soon-to-be
disappearance of collateral restrictions and civil disabilities from US law. Three
different factors that emerged at different moments during the past century,
however, paved the way for, and ultimately led to, new generations of impactful
collateral ramiﬁcations of criminal convictions, collectively referred to by Jack
Chin (2012) as the “new civil death.”
Consider ﬁrst the loss of welfare beneﬁts as a result of a criminal conviction.
The American Welfare State was established by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New
Deal” in the 1930s as a response to the Great Depression and later revised and
extended by Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great Society” in the 1960s and Bill
Clinton’s “Welfare to work” in the 1990s (Garland, 2016). Before these social
welfare programs were created, until at least the mid-twentieth century in
America there were considerably fewer public beneﬁts to lose because of a crimi-
nal conviction compared to nowadays (Chin, 2012, p. 1802).
A similar point can be made about occupational licensing restrictions arising
from a conviction. The widespread adoption of state occupational licensing laws
represented a key feature of the rise of the regulatory state in the United States
(Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003). Such process began at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and by the 1950s, over 1,200 licensing laws had been passed, “averaging 25
per state, and covering over 75 different occupations.” They were mostly the
result of an increasing specialization of knowledge and also part of a strategy
aimed at tackling information asymmetries and helping the market function
more efﬁciently (Law & Kim, 2011, p. 123). Before the exponential growth of
occupational licensing laws, occupational restrictions ﬂowing from a criminal
conviction were way less numerous and impactful on the lives of ex-offenders.
The last factor to be considered is the shift toward more punitive criminal jus-
tice laws, policies, and practices, especially beginning in the 1980s. Punitive poli-
cies rapidly achieved an impressive popular consensus, and the mid-1990s
marked the peak of the tough on crime period. Overall, those years represented
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“an era of punitive hostility unparalleled in modern US history” (Zimring, 2010,
p. 1245). What Jonathan Simon (2007) so eloquently termed “governing through
crime” became a central and bipartisan electorally lucrative feature of the politi-
cal debate in America. In this context, crime control soon became a mode of
governance and regulation. In contrast to the pre-1980s period, CCs of convic-
tions started to grow rapidly in number and scope (Olivares, Burton, & Cullen,
1996). Civil disabilities and restrictions imposed on ex-offenders came to repre-
sent a “hidden” yet highly effective device of exclusion for persons deemed dan-
gerous and/or unworthy for their criminal past (Ewald, 2011).
The crackdown on welfare beneﬁts for persons with a criminal history illus-
trates the point. In 1996, President Bill Clinton’s welfare reform  the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)  intro-
duced a permanent eligibility ban on federal welfare beneﬁts, including food
stamps, for anyone convicted in state or federal courts of a felony drug offense,
including marijuana possession.4 The Clinton administration also supported
laws denying federal ﬁnancial aid to students with drug convictions.
Furthermore, other newly enacted measures made it easier to deny public hous-
ing to people with a criminal record. A “one strike and you’re out” rule was
passed, which meant that the commission of one offense became a legitimate
basis to render a person ineligible to be admitted to or remain in public housing.
Anyone convicted of producing methamphetamine in public housing or of a sex
offense requiring lifetime registration is now automatically excluded from public
and federally assisted housing. Moreover, public housing authorities have been
given broad discretion to deny admission to individuals convicted for other
offenses, especially drug-related and violent crimes. Last but not least, families
can be evicted from public housing if one family member living in the premises
or a guest has a criminal history for even minor drug-related criminal activity
(Alexander, 2010, pp. 5657; Silva, 2015).
Sex offender registration and notiﬁcation laws are other telling examples of
CCs of convictions that ﬂourished during the tough on crime era. The ﬁrst sex
offender registries in the United States were enacted in the late 1940s as a way
“to inform the police of the whereabouts of habitual sex offenders.” The idea
soon lost favor to so-called sexual psychopath laws. By the 1970s, however, such
laws had likewise lost approval, “either being repealed or widely ignored as inef-
fective and unjust policies” (Hoppe, 2016, p. 577; see also Rice Leave, 2009).
Everything changed in the 1990s, following high proﬁle cases of abduction and
sexual torture of children in the above-described climate of raising punitiveness.
The ﬁrst state sex offender law was passed in Washington State in 1990 pro-
viding only for a registration requirement for people convicted for certain sexual
offenses. In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act requiring states to
implement sex offender registries. The 1996 Megan’s Law required each state to
provide notiﬁcation and information to communities about convicted sex offen-
ders living in the area. This federal law applies to all sex offenders irrespective
of whether their victims were children or adults. The subsequent Sex Offender
Registration and Notiﬁcation Act of 2006 (SORNA) mandated the creation of a
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nationwide online registration and notiﬁcation system and provided a set of
minimum standards across the United States (Jones & Newburn, 2013,
pp. 444446; Logan, 2009, pp. 49 ff.). Several other “regulatory” restrictions
targeting sex offenders have been passed in at least 30 states; for example, regis-
tered sex offenders often cannot live near day-care centers, schools, or parks.
Sex offenders have become the suspect class par excellence, pariahs oftentimes
left with no alternatives than living as exiled at home (Jackson & Feige, 2013;
Tewksbury, 2007).
The current size of felon disenfranchisement in America is, likewise, a poison-
ous fruit of the tough on crime era. Beginning with the Civil Rights era, restric-
tions on the voting rights of convicted persons have gradually diminished
signiﬁcantly (Uggen, Behrens, & Manza, 2005, p. 309). However, the unprece-
dented rise in felony convictions that has occurred since the mid-1970s has led
to an exponential growth of people subject to disenfranchisement.5 A recent
study of the Sentencing Project reported that in 2016 an estimated 6.1 million
people were disenfranchised due to a felony conviction, up from 1.2 million in
1976 (Uggen, Larson, & Shannon, 2016).
“DON’T YOU RECOGNIZE PUNISHMENT WHEN YOU
SEE IT?”: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
US Courts: A Jurisprudence of Deference
Seemingly with little remorse, the US courts appear to have bought into the idea
that CCs constitute mere “side effects” of conviction, totally unrelated to the
criminal justice process and criminal law principles. The exponential growth of
CCs in the US over the past four decades has been due, to a great extent, to the
excessive deference shown by courts to federal and state legislatures. Simply
classifying such onerous and afﬂictive restrictions as “regulatory” measures
aimed at promoting public safety and various other goals has been deemed sufﬁ-
cient to make the state prevail in courts in what has been dubbed the “civil-crim-
inal labeling game” (Dershowitz, 1973, p. 1295). Consequently, the inherent
punitive purpose of many civil regulations triggered by a conviction is ﬁcti-
tiously obfuscated by their formal classiﬁcation. The jurisprudence of the US
Supreme Court, in particular, has “continued the ﬁction” that CCs serve no
punitive function (Demleitner, 2014, p. 962), thereby making constitutional con-
straints on the state’s power to punish inapplicable  in particular the Ex Post
Facto Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Constitutional challenges against CCs of conviction such as felon disenfran-
chisement, civil commitment, and sex offender registration have been rejected
based on the argument that they constitute mere civil regulatory measures rather
than genuine punitive sanctions. For example, in Trop vs Dulles (1958), the
Court held that felon disenfranchisement does not constitute punishment, but
rather a nonpenal exercise of the state power to regulate the franchise, and
therefore is not cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. In Kansas vs
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Hendricks (1997), the Court asserted that the indeﬁnite post-sentence commit-
ment of individuals convicted of a sex offense and deemed dangerous by the
state due to a mental illness does not violate Double Jeopardy guarantees since
it merely involves “civil” rather than “criminal” commitment. In Smith vs Doe
(2003), the Court held that sex offender registration laws are nonpunitive and
may be enforced ex post facto. In their analysis, the US courts “generally give
great deference to the legislature’s stated intent and rely heavily on the statutory
language and legislative history of the statute” (Robinson, 2005, p. 351; see also
Lucken, 2013). Whether a statutory scheme is civil or criminal is therefore usu-
ally resolved primarily as a question of statutory intent.
Even when the Supreme Court has attempted to establish a test for determin-
ing whether a sanction is a criminal punishment or civil regulation, the outcome
has not been particularly helpful or stringent. According to the test developed in
the 1963 case Kennedy vs Mendoza-Martinez, if the legislative intent was to
establish a civil regulatory scheme, then courts must closely examine seven non-
exhaustive, unweighted factors to determine whether the burden imposed by the
statute is punitive in effect.6 Furthermore, only “clearest proof” will sufﬁce to
override legislative intent and “transform” what has been labeled a civil measure
into a criminal punishment for the application of constitutional guarantees. Not
surprisingly, thus far no civil regulation has ever been found to be punitive in
nature under such test, inherently characterized by fuzziness and an extremely
high burden of proof for those challenging a statute as imposing punishment
(Kaiser, 2016b, p. 355; Logan, 1998, p. 1282).
A radical shift in the US courts’ jurisprudence regarding the civil/criminal
divide does not seem in sight. However, a few recent judicial decisions might
signal a slowly growing awareness of the inherent punitive nature of certain
legislative measures deemed to be regulatory and nonpunitive schemes. For
example, in a remarkable decision issued in 2016, Does vs Snyder, the US Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that amendments to Michigan’s Sex
Offender Registration Act (SORA) are unconstitutional because they impose
retroactive punishment on sex offenders in violation of the Constitution’s prohi-
bition on ex post facto laws (Does #15 vs Snyder, 2016). The court looked at
ﬁve of the seven nondispositive Mendoza-Martinez factors and concluded that
all ﬁve supported a ﬁnding that various provisions of SORA were indeed puni-
tive. In particular, the court observes, while the vast array of restrictions retroac-
tively imposed on convicted sex offenders “is not identical to any traditional
punishments, it meets the general deﬁnition of punishment, has much in com-
mon with banishment and public shaming, and has a number of similarities to
parole/probation” (Snyder, p. 703).7
State courts too are increasingly applying a stricter scrutiny analysis to cer-
tain CCs, especially on ex post facto grounds. For example, a noteworthy 2013
decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, Doe vs Department of Public Safety
and Correctional Services, struck down a new registration requirement for con-
victed sex offenders on the basis that it violated a clause in the Maryland
Declaration of Rights prohibiting retroactive laws. The majority opinion
observed, “Registration was imposed, over twenty years later in 2009, under the
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sex offender registration statute as a direct consequence of Petitioner’s commis-
sion and conviction for his sex crime. The application of the statute has essen-
tially the same effect upon Petitioner’s life as placing him on probation and
imposing the punishment of shaming for life, and is, thus, tantamount to impos-
ing an additional sanction for Petitioner’s crime” (Doe, p. 40).
European Courts: An Anti-subversion Jurisprudence
The American way of dealing with CCs of convictions is in sharp contrast with
the European approach. The differing attitudes toward collateral sanctions in
the United States and Europe can be explained by differing basic ideologies of
punishment and criminal justice, and a different approach of courts toward
interpreting constitutions and enforcing basic principles of criminal punishment
in the context of collateral restrictions.
European criminal justice policies and punishment schemes, including CCs,
are enacted and justiﬁed with hyperspeciﬁc rationales and an intense focus on
proportionality.8 Penal systems in Europe distinguish between main and ancil-
lary criminal sanctions and “courts are required to consider the impact of all
combined sanctions on the defendant and society in light of the purposes of pun-
ishment” (Demleitner, 2009, p. 86). Collateral restrictions in the United States,
instead, are not taken into account in determining the overall proportionality of
the sentence to the seriousness of the offense since they are not considered as
punishment.9 Furthermore, Europe never moved completely away from a reha-
bilitative model of punishment. Even though increasingly punitive policies have
been enacted in recent decades, the ultimate goal of European penal systems
widely remains the reintegration of ex-offenders (Whitman, 2003, p. 73).10 In
contrast, the approach toward collateral restrictions in the United States tends
to mirror prevailing criminal justice attitudes oriented primarily toward harsh
and prolonged measures of penal control.
Yet, all that glitters is not gold. In Europe, too, especially over the past three
decades, the enactment of a growing number of civil and “regulatory” measures
has attempted to reshape and subvert the boundaries of criminal punishment.
However, this attempt of subversion has not gone unnoticed. Domestic courts
and, in particular, the ECtHR have stood up against the erosion of basic princi-
ples and protections and have insisted on substance over form in determining
what constitutes punishment (Ashworth, 2008, pp. 421422; Zedner, 2016). The
approach of European courts is therefore in stark contrast to the marked judicial
deference exhibited by US judges regarding legislative labels of “criminal” or
“civil.” While the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has sought to develop standards that
apply to sanctioning policies in the broad sense, the US Supreme Court has
established a “minimal constitutional ﬂoor,” which has allowed states a broad
and often unfettered discretion in enacting a wide patchwork of burdensome
regulatory sanctions, which frequently pursue punitive goals although located
outside the formal domain of criminal punishment (Demleitner, 2009, p. 103).11
As it has been noted, “[j]udicial deference is a hazard because if courts uncrit-
ically accept the legislative designation of a measure as not punishment the lesser
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procedural protections of civil or administrative procedure apply.” Unlike their
American counterparts, European courts “have challenged formal designations,
looked behind legislative labels and insisted upon the right to apply independent
criteria to determine whether or not a measure is punishment, irrespective of its
ofﬁcial status” (Zedner, 2016, p. 11).
In so doing, courts in the Old Continent, ﬁrst and foremost the ECtHR,
“have challenged the notion that the deﬁning punishment is a matter of legisla-
tive feat and instead insisted that terms like criminal charge and penalty are
properly matters for the courts” (Zedner, 2016, pp. 1112).
Undeniably, the ECtHR’s case law, in particular, represents nothing less
than an “anti-subversion device […] to prevent governments from manipulating
the criminal/civil boundary” (Ashworth & Horder, 2013, p. 3).
Over time, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has developed an autonomous
notion of “criminal matter” (see Engel and Others vs the Netherlands, 1976, and
its progeny). Within this jurisprudence, the Court has developed autonomous
concepts of “criminal charge” as per Article 6 (procedural safeguards in criminal
proceedings), and “criminal offense” and “criminal penalty” as per Article 7 of
the European Convention on Human Rights (no crime, no punishment without
law  nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege).
Article 7 represents the European equivalent of the US Ex Post Facto
Clause. With speciﬁc regard to penalties, Article 7(1) prohibits the imposition of
more severe penalties than those that were applicable at the time the offense was
committed. The leading case is Welch vs the United Kingdom (1995) where the
Court stated that “To render the protection offered by Article 7 effective, the
Court must remain free to go behind appearances and assess for itself whether a
particular measure amounts in substance to a ‘penalty’” (§ 27).
In Welch, the Court set out the criteria to determine autonomously whether a
speciﬁc measure is substantively a “penalty” within the meaning of Article 7(1),
regardless of the qualiﬁcation given under national law (Schabas, 2015,
pp. 345346).
The starting point for any assessment of the existence of a “criminal penalty”
is to ascertain whether the measure in question is imposed following conviction
for a “criminal offense.” Other factors that may be also taken into account in
this respect are as follows: (1) “the nature and purpose of the measure in ques-
tion” (particularly its punitive aim), (2) “its characterization under national
law,” (3) “the procedures involved in the making and implementation of the
measure,” and (4) “its severity” (Welch vs the United Kingdom, § 28). However,
“the severity of the measure is not in itself decisive, since many nonpenal mea-
sures of a preventive nature may have a substantial impact on the person con-
cerned” (Welch vs the United Kingdom, § 32).
Thus, unlike what happens in the US system, formally civil or regulatory
sanctions may be challenged on ex post facto grounds. It is meaningful that two
very similar cases, both involving ex post facto civil commitment schemes 
Kansas vs Hendricks (1997) and M. vs Germany (2009)  have been decided in
opposite ways on the different sides of the Atlantic as far as the deﬁnition of
what is “punitive” is concerned (Slobogin, 2013). The ECtHR held that the
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retroactive application of the modiﬁed German preventive detention scheme
ought to be qualiﬁed as a “penalty” for the purposes of Article 7(1) of the
Convention. At the same time, it must be noted that the record of the ECtHR’s
jurisprudence on the retroactive imposition of “penalties” is not totally uncontro-
versial. For example, it has been held that the retroactive obligation for convicted
sex offenders to register in a national Sex Offender Database pursues a purely pre-
ventive and dissuasive aim and therefore cannot be regarded as punitive in nature
(Gardel vs France, 2009).
But what about formally nonpunitive sanctions not involving any ex post
facto issue?
It must ﬁrst be noted that, within the framework of the European
Convention on Human Rights, the classiﬁcation of a certain measure as a “pen-
alty” for the purposes of Article 7 is also relevant in determining the applicabil-
ity of the ne bis in idem rule (equivalent to the US Double Jeopardy Clause)
provided for in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. In the case of
automatic CCs of a criminal conviction, no double jeopardy violation could be
found for they ﬂow from the same proceeding. If certain conditions are met,
however, this type of collateral ramiﬁcations may be challenged on grounds of
vagueness  that is lack of clarity making the overall punitive response follow-
ing a conviction unpredictable. In its case law, the ECtHR has repeatedly main-
tained that the principle of legality of punishment entails that the qualitative
requirements of accessibility and foreseeability must be satisﬁed with regard to
the penalties the charged offense carries. If need be, the defendant must be
assisted by the court when the full range of punitive consequences potentially
stemming from a conviction is unclear (see, e.g., Kafkaris vs Cyprus, 2008,
§ 140). This would be the case, as it frequently happens in the US context, when
collateral sanctions are scattered throughout numerous laws, inconspicuous, and
of variable application (Kaiser, 2016a; Wolff, 2011, p. 192). More generally, the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR adopts what can be called a “holistic” approach to
the subject of penalties. Sentencing judges are therefore encouraged to be aware
of the full panoply of punitive restrictions automatically ﬂowing from a convic-
tion, so as to take them into account in calculating an appropriate sentence.
Things are different in case of restrictions formally labeled as civil yet puni-
tive in nature imposed as a result of an additional proceeding arising from the
same offense. This is in light of the ne bis in idem principle. In the European con-
text, many severe, nonautomatic CCs “American style” might be held in viola-
tion of the right not to be punished twice under the criminal law for the same
offense. In contrast, as previously noted, CCs are deemed civil/regulatory mea-
sures by the US courts and, for this reason, cannot be challenged on double
jeopardy grounds (Pinard, 2006, pp. 640641).
However, in a recent judgment, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR seems to
have weakened the protection offered by the ne bis in idem principle. In the case
of A and B vs Norway (2016), the Court ruled that Art. 4 of Protocol No. 7 is
not violated by dual proceedings arising from the same conduct, provided that
certain conditions are fulﬁlled. The case concerned two taxpayers who claimed
that they had been prosecuted and punished twice  in administrative and
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criminal proceedings  for the same offense. The Court observed that, “whilst
different sanctions were imposed by two different authorities in different pro-
ceedings, there was nevertheless a sufﬁciently close connection between them,
both in substance and in time, to consider them as forming part of an integral
scheme of sanctions” (§ 147).12
DISCUSSION OF POLICY PROPOSALS
In this ﬁnal part, I discuss three policy framework proposals that have been put
forward by scholars, professional associations, and independent organizations to
deal more appropriately and more justly with CCs of criminal convictions.
Collateral Consequences as Preventive Regulation
A body of scholarship argues that CCs of conviction should not be conceived
and treated as punishment but rather as measures that are part of the broad
state regulatory power aimed at preventing the risk of future harm. Some pro-
pose to accept CCs as nonpunitive state regulation and then criticize them for
being an excessive and unjust interference of the government with citizens’ lib-
erty (Cullen, Lero Jonson, & Mears, 2017, p. 76).
Others adopt a “regulatory approach” to CCs starting from a normative deﬁ-
nition of punishment strongly rooted in a notion of desert proportionality  a
theory that does not easily tolerate utilitarian concerns and objectives: sentences
should be proportionate in their severity to the gravity of the offense committed
(von Hirsch & Wasik, p. 1997; Mayson, 2015). While these authors acknowledge
that it is difﬁcult to develop a unitary account of CCs for they are often distrib-
uted along a punishment-prevention spectrum, it has been argued that collateral
restrictions generally claim primary authorization “from a judgment of future
risk” while punishment, on the contrary, inherently “claims normative authori-
zation from a judgment of past culpability” (Mayson, 2015, p. 305). Along these
same lines, it has been also contended that purely incapacitative measures can-
not be considered as punishment at all: “locking people in prison with the sole
aim of incapacitating them […] does not constitute punishing them,” and this is
for only measures that are intentionally condemnatory for a past conduct and
burdensome qualify as such (Hoskins, 2016, pp. 260261).
Within this framework, a heightened scrutiny is proposed that would require
the state to demonstrate that CCs triggered by a conviction represent a justiﬁ-
able, cost-effective, and reasonable means to achieve their public safety/harm
prevention goal in the individual case. According to its proponents, only a few
collateral restrictions would eventually pass the test and survive (von Hirsch &
Wasik, 1997, p. 624; Mayson, 2015, pp. 359360).
I certainly appreciate and concur in the proposal to reject a blanket judgment
of future risk arising from the status of being a convicted offender. However, this
proposal is not immune from criticism. First, it seems to forget there are actually
ﬁve generally accepted goals of sentencing (retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
restoration, and rehabilitation) and that in the US none of them has primacy. As
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the Supreme Court has noted in Ewing vs California (2003), the Constitution
“does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory. A sentence can have a
variety of justiﬁcations, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabili-
tation.” It is therefore impossible, both from a theoretical and from a practical
standpoint, to rule out a measure as not constituting punishment only because,
either primarily or exclusively, it pursues a preventive goal. As it has been noted,
“borders between penal and non-penal measures cannot be set by reference to pur-
pose alone; so the claim that a measure is primarily preventive does not necessarily
take it outside the realm of punishment” (Zedner, 2016, p. 7).
In virtually any jurisdiction at the federal and state level sentencing policies
and practices consider, at least to some degree, utilitarian concerns including
risk-prevention. In a non-negligible number of cases, they can even trump retrib-
utive proportionality considerations (Hamilton, 2015, pp. 271277). The pro-
posed framework thus appears as an “idealized” model that does not fully
consider the reality of sentencing law, policy, and practices.
Second, by not integrating punishment and CCs in any way, the suggested
model does not provide for any “overall proportionality cap,” neither in terms
of retributive-proportionality nor in terms of utilitarian “ends-beneﬁts” propor-
tionality concerned with the suitability of means to ends (Frase, 2013,
pp. 3233). Absent any such cap, there is potentially no limit to the number of
burdensome consequences ﬂowing from a criminal conviction, ﬁrst as criminal
punishment and then as regulatory measures. In particular, the offender risks
preventative considerations to be appraised ﬁrst at sentencing and then also at a
later time in connection with the application of certain CCs. Furthermore, as
long as a given collateral restriction meets the above-listed criteria (justiﬁability,
cost-effectiveness, and reasonableness), it should be applied regardless of the
broader punitive context in which it is inscribed.
Third, an individualized risk assessment in a risk-averse society like the one
we live in does not necessarily entail that a signiﬁcant number of CCs is set aside.
Decision-makers might decide to err on the side of safety (Bushway & Sweeten,
2007; Mythen, 2014). Finally, and not least importantly, the “regulatory
approach” does not extend to CCs ex post facto guarantees prohibiting the enact-
ment of retroactive burdensome restrictions hindering ex-offenders’ reentry.
Collateral Consequences as Part of the Sentencing Context
In recent years, the American Bar Association (2004), the Uniform Law
Commission (2010), and the American Law Institute (2017) have put forward
broad recommendations aimed at integrating, to various degrees, CCs into the
sentencing process, but not as formal criminal penalties. Such proposals do not
make CCs part of the sentence but rather part of the sentencing context.
All three recommendations present common features: (1) identify, collect,
and publish CCs so that judges, defendants, prosecutors, and policy-makers can
be aware of the full scope of civil penalties, disqualiﬁcations, and disabilities
that follow a conviction; (2) incorporate CCs into the criminal process, particu-
larly with regard to plea bargaining. This would allow to overcome the
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traditional direct/collateral dichotomy in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for
which a trial court must inform a defendant of the direct consequences of plead-
ing guilty but not of the collateral restrictions and civil disabilities ﬂowing from
it;13 (3) limit the number of applicable collateral sanctions to those justiﬁable for
public safety reasons and for which the current offense provides a substantial
basis for imposition; (4) provide relief mechanisms to eliminate or mitigate the
impact of collateral sanctions to help the reentry process of ex-offenders.
Section 6 of the Uniform Law Commission’s CCs of Conviction Act (thus far
only adopted by the state of Vermont) provides for notice of CCs at sentencing
and, in addition, if an individual is sentenced to imprisonment, at the time of
release.
The statutory text of Model Penal Code: Sentencing, recently approved by
the American Law Institute, re-examines the sentencing provisions of the ALI’s
1962 Model Penal Code. It provides that, at the time of sentencing, the court
shall inform the offender of “all CCs that apply under state and federal law as a
result of the current conviction.” Judges shall also warn offenders that applica-
ble CCs can change over time (i.e., the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply)
and in different jurisdictions, and that relief mechanism is available (§ 7.04(1)).
The MPC proposal also recommends giving courts the power to remove manda-
tory collateral restrictions related to employment, education, housing, public
beneﬁts, registration, and occupational licensing as early as sentencing and to
certify rehabilitation after a period of law-abiding conduct. However, a court-
issued order of relief would merely remove the mandatory nature of certain
CCs. The ﬁnal word on their imposition is left to the discretion of authorized
decision-makers (e.g., licensing boards) on a case-by-case basis (Love, 2015,
p. 280). In particular, the decision on whether to confer a discretionary opportu-
nity or beneﬁt “may be denied notwithstanding the court’s order of relief if the
conduct underlying the conviction is determined to be substantially related to
the beneﬁt or opportunity the individual seeks to obtain” (§ 7.04(3)).
Finally, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards go further, providing that “The
legislature should authorize the sentencing court to take into account, and the
court should consider, applicable collateral sanctions in determining an offen-
der’s overall sentence” (Standard 19-2.4(a); see also Love & Chin, 2004). CCs
and civil disabilities that adversely impact ex-offenders following a conviction
would, therefore, be considered as a sentencing factor. However, as a “mere” sen-
tencing factor, CCs could potentially be given little consideration in the exercise
of the courts’ sentencing discretion or balanced against other factors.
Collateral Consequences as Formal Punishment
The two policy frameworks discussed above acknowledge the jarring discrep-
ancy between form and substance: CCs function and are experienced as punish-
ment. Yet, at the same time, such proposals seem to be aimed mainly at
curtailing the negative effects triggered by collateral restrictions rather than put-
ting forward an alternative normative framework to deal more effectively with
the pervasive problem represented by “collateral” sanctions. Many consequences
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formally labeled as nonpunitive “are anything but ‘collateral’ to a defendant”
and “may, in fact, dwarf the criminal sanction” (Roberts, 2008, p. 740).
Collateral sanctions almost invariably serve the function of constitutional pun-
ishment and the criminal justice system should account for it (Chin, 2012,
p. 1830).
My suggestion is to reboot the discourse about civil disabilities and other
“collateral” restrictions stemming from criminal convictions starting with the
acknowledgment that “[t]he current collateral-consequences rule rests on doc-
trinally ﬂawed ground, is outdated, and is simply bad theory and policy”
(Roberts, 2008, p. 740). Afﬂictive and burdensome CCs should be fully inte-
grated into the criminal process as additional criminal penalties. This means
that they should be “converted into elements of a sentence” and become an inte-
gral part of sentencing law and policy (Demleitner, 2005, p. 359).
If promoted to the status of formal punishment, collateral restrictions would
enjoy the full panoply of constitutional guarantees that apply to criminal sta-
tutes, in particular, the prohibitions on ex post facto laws and double jeopardy.
In this scenario, the sentencing judge would be the only decision-maker in
charge for imposing those penalties. Under the proposed framework, no room
would be left for collateral legal sanctions imposed automatically on a person
upon conviction that are totally disconnected from the criminal justice process.
As formal criminal punishments, “collateral” sanctions would be systematized
and largely reduced in number. Legal disabilities would be imposed only when
deemed appropriate in connection with the offense being sentenced, in any case
for a limited period of time.
Disabilities, restrictions, and disqualiﬁcations provided for in criminal statutes
should be germane to the characteristics of the offense of conviction, so that the
punishment truly ﬁt the crime. Triggering offenses should be indicated by refer-
ence to speciﬁc statutes and/or categories (e.g., offenses involving physical vio-
lence) instead of broad categories or vague deﬁnitions (e.g., crimes involving
“moral turpitude”). For example, disenfrachisement should not be linked to any
felony other than those connected with the exercise of the franchise; professional
disqualiﬁcations should be available only for offenses in relation to which they
can actually serve the purpose of minimizing the offender’s speciﬁc risk of reof-
fending (e.g., disqualiﬁcation from childcare professions in case of a conviction
for sexual assault of a minor, or disqualiﬁcation from the exercise of managerial
or executive functions bearing a direct relationship to the conduct constituting
the offense in case of a conviction for a crime involving fraud or deceit).
Furthermore, and very importantly, as an integral part of the overall sen-
tence, the imposition of such disabilities as criminal punishment should be con-
strained by a retributive as well as utilitarian notion of proportionality. As a
result, fewer restrictions would be imposed and for shorter periods of time; a
halt would be put to the current, substantially unchecked, “piling on” of the
CCs of a criminal conviction. Reimagining CCs as criminal penalties would
enable sentencing courts to better calibrate the sentence. Nowadays, too many
prison sentences are imposed. Broadening the number of applicable punishments
would ultimately help the penal system move beyond the overly polarized and
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prison-centric arsenal of criminal sanctions currently available (Morris & Tonry,
1990). It is well known that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence seems “to recog-
nize meaningful proportionality constraints in all punishment contexts other
than that of prison duration” (Frase, 2005, p. 599). The innovation I propose
here would contribute to a gradual shift toward more eclectic sentencing policies
and practices, with shorter prison terms being imposed and portions of them
being “replaced” by temporary disabilities or disqualiﬁcations, if available and
deemed appropriate. Following release from prison or discharge from probation
or parole, restrictions imposed as part of the sentence should be removable by
means of court-issued orders granted at the request of the person concerned after
the passage of a predetermined crime-free period and upon presentation of evi-
dence of effective active redemption.
With regard to collateral sanctions discretionarily imposed by decision-
makers located outside the criminal justice system following a background check
(especially stigmatization and employment and housing discrimination), access
to and dissemination of criminal history information should be restricted and
heavily regulated in order to prevent shunning and internal exile. Today, a
strong public policy preference exists in the United States for the openness of
criminal records. First Amendment considerations, open government principles,
and the need for public control over the administration of criminal justice are
routinely invoked to justify this approach. Criminal records are available to the
general public through a vast array of sources, such as court records databases,
federal and state criminal history repositories, and private vendors’ websites
(Jacobs, 2015). At the same time, however, Europe shows that an open criminal
records policy is not an inevitable feature of democratic and transparent govern-
ment in the Digital Age. Policy-making with regard to the availability and dis-
semination of criminal records should properly take into account competing
individual and societal interests that are equally valid and compelling, in partic-
ular, the rehabilitation of ex-offenders (Corda, 2016, 2018).
Lastly, it must be noted that the idea of delegating the task of protecting soci-
ety from dangerous individuals to private players such as employers and land-
lords through criminal background investigation appears to rely on the
controversial assumption that, compared to the state, “they are in a better posi-
tion to provide safety, albeit at the cost of eventually engaging in discriminatory
practices” (Larrauri, 2014, p. 62). In contrast to this approach, I believe that the
criminal law and criminal justice actors are better equipped to do so. Additional
penalties imposed at sentencing in the form of occupational disqualiﬁcations or
other temporary restrictions would represent an effective tool to minimize risks
that may extend beyond the completion of a term of imprisonment or commu-
nity supervision.
CONCLUSION
Collateral consequences of convictions substantially hinder the reintegration of
ex-offenders long after the sentence has been served in full and increase the like-
lihood of recidivism. A vast number of them operate regardless of whether an
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offender has been convicted for a felony or a misdemeanor and irrespective of
whether he or she has been sentenced to incarceration, probation, or the pay-
ment of a ﬁne. Although CCs formally operate beyond and independently of the
sentence imposed in a criminal court, this chapter has shown that they represent
an integral component of the contemporary penal landscape in the United
States.
Today, US criminal justice policies are slowly starting to sober up after the
punitive hangover that lasted from the mid-1980s to (at least) the mid-2000s.
While we are witnessing “legislative and political signs of penal-climate change”
(Green, 2015, p. 273), a clear and consistent pattern is yet to be detected
(Beckett, Reosti, & Knaphus, 2016; Tonry, 2016). For a long time, CCs have
been left out of the picture of the overall punitive response triggered by a crimi-
nal conviction. Ongoing discussions on sentencing reform cannot forget about
them: the paradox would be apparent. Even if sentencing policies and practices
moved toward more lenient outcomes (at least for some categories of offenses),
the system would maintain its exclusionary harshness nearly intact in the post-
sentence life of ex-offenders.
An inherent contradiction exists, for example, in policies of massive invest-
ments in reentry programs (e.g., the Second Chance Act Grant Program) that
simultaneously leave collateral restrictions out of the equation. Attempts to leg-
islate reintegration or “smart reentry” are doomed to fail if the issue of CCs is
not considered and tackled properly and effectively. Likewise, no reform aimed
at moving away from mass incarceration and overreliance on penal control can
ultimately succeed if indirect ramiﬁcations of “being a criminal” are ignored.
Collateral restrictions ﬂowing from a criminal conviction should no longer rep-
resent “invisible ingredients in the legislative menu of criminal sanctions”
(Travis, 2002, p. 17). As I have argued in this chapter, CCs should be fully inte-
grated into the sentencing process as a formal part of the sentence, thus moving
beyond the legal ﬁction of the divide between direct and indirect consequences
of a criminal conviction. The future of American criminal justice is still unwrit-
ten, but unquestionably CCs will represent a critical litmus test for sentencing
reform in the years to come.
NOTES
1. The German Penal Code, respectively in sections 44 and 45, further distinguishes
between Nebenstrafen (additional criminal penalties) and Nebenfolgen (collateral conse-
quences of conviction). The only listed additional criminal penalty is temporary driving
ban. Collateral consequences include various bans and disqualiﬁcation that are usually
labeled as ancillary penalties in other continental jurisdictions. Some scholars hold the
view that Nebenfolgen are not criminal penalties in a narrow sense as they are not so
labeled. On the contrary, other scholars consider the fact that both sections 44 and 45 are
listed under the heading of Title I on “Criminal penalties” (Strafen)  forming part of
Chapter 3 of the Penal Code devoted to “Legal Sanctions” broadly deﬁned
(Rechtsfolgen)  as a decisive argument for their penal nature. Chapter 3 also includes a
Title VI listing a range of “Measures of rehabilitation and incapacitation” (Maßregeln der
Besserung und Sicherung) having purely preventive goals. Among those provisions, sec-
tions 69 and 70 provide for, respectively, disqualiﬁcation from driving and disqualiﬁcation
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from exercising a profession. Strictly speaking, these are not criminal penalties since their
imposition does not presuppose that the offender acted in a blameworthy fashion (i.e., no
proof of guilt is required).
2. For example, Article 65 of the Portuguese Penal Code is very clear in stating that a
criminal conviction does not necessarily result in the loss of civil, professional, or political
rights. Rather, the law may link the commission of speciﬁed offenses to losing certain
rights and privileges or to the ban on exercising certain professions.
3. Available data suggest that nearly 90% of employers conduct background checks
on job applicants at some point of the hiring process (Society for Human Resource
Management, 2012).
4. As of 2016, 18 states have completely abandoned the federal ban on drug offenders
receiving food stamps. Twenty-six other states have partly eased those restrictions. Only
six states (Alaska, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming)
continue to fully enforce the War on Drugs-era ban. As for welfare beneﬁts for drug
felons, 13 states continue to prohibit anyone with a drug-related conviction from getting
welfare beneﬁts, and 23 others maintain a partial ban (Hager, 2016).
5. In the United States, more than one million felony convictions are pronounced
every year in state and federal courts. Only half, approximately, result in a prison term
(Rosenmerkel, Durose, & Farole, 2009). Over 10 million misdemeanor cases are prose-
cuted in the same time.
6. The seven-factors are: (1) whether the sanction involves an afﬁrmative disability or
restraint, (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, (3) whether it
comes into play only on a ﬁnding of scienter, (4) whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment  retribution and deterrence, (5) whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned.
7. The state of Michigan appealed the Sixth Circuit decision before the Supreme
Court. In October 2017, the Court denied review, and in so doing upheld the ruling.
Hence, Michigan has been prevented from extending new sex offender registry rules retro-
actively to registrants who had been convicted before the new provisions were enacted.
8. See, for example, Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union: “The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal
offense.”
9. As a matter of fact, US courts conduct little proportionality analysis on any pun-
ishment outside the death penalty context (Steiker & Steiker, 2016, pp. 276282).
10. Evidence of this is provided by the fact that several European countries embrace
rehabilitation as a constitutional mandate. See, for example, Article 27(3) of the Italian
Constitution of 1948: “Punishment cannot consist in treatments contrary to human dig-
nity and must aim at rehabilitating the convicted offender”); and Article 25(2) of the
Spanish Constitution of 1978: “Punishments entailing imprisonment and security mea-
sures shall be aimed at re-education and social rehabilitation and may not involve forced
labor.” The German Federal Constitutional Court in the famous life imprisonment case
of 1977 (BVerfGE 45, 187, June 21, 1977) maintained that rehabilitation is “constitution-
ally required in any community that establishes human dignity as its center piece and
commits itself to the principle of social justice.”
11. It must be acknowledged that supra-national courts traditionally have more
leeway in looking beyond legislative classiﬁcations of domestic law compared to national
courts.
12. The two proceedings were conducted in parallel and the facts established in one
proceeding were used in the other one. Furthermore, the sentence imposed following con-
viction at trial had regard to the penalty imposed in the administrative proceeding.
13. A notable exception to the direct/collateral dichotomy has been established for
deportation by the Supreme Court in the case of Padilla vs Kentucky (2010).
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